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This study aimed to identify and explain the 
mechanism underlying decision-making behaviors 
adaptive to AI advice. We develop a new theoretical 
framework by drawing on the anchoring effect and the 
literature on experiential learning. We focus on two 
factors: (1) the difference between individuals’ initial 
estimates and AI advice and (2) the existence of a 
second anchor (i.e., previous-year credit scores). We 
conducted two longitudinal experiments in the 
corporate credit rating context, where correct answers 
exist stochastically. We found that individuals exhibit 
some paradoxical behaviors. With greater differences 
and no second anchor, individuals are more likely to 
make adjustment efforts, but their initial estimates 
remain strong anchors. Yet, in multiple-anchor contexts 
individuals tend to diminish dependence on their initial 
estimates. We also found that the accuracy of 
individuals was dependent on their debiasing efforts.  
1. Introduction  
Researchers [e.g., 1, 2]  have highlighted that AI 
can accentuate biases in human decision making and 
that decision makers must attempt to understand the 
fairness of algorithms. Additionally, existing literature 
demonstrates that individuals can hold the contradictory 
biased attitudes of algorithm appreciation—
individuals’ adherence to algorithmic advice compared 
to human advice [3]—and algorithm aversion—
individuals’ aversion to algorithmic recommendations 
[4, 5]. Researchers have identified several factors 
characterizing decision-making contexts that could 
mitigate algorithm aversion (or appreciation), such as 
expertise [3] and the power to create alternatives [5]. 
This means that different individuals may interpret the 
value of AI advice differently. Such contradictory 
attitudes may depend on how individuals perceive the 
value vis-à-vis their preexisting judgements in decision-
making processes and how AI advice is provided. 
Additionally, regarding the evolutionary nature of 
individuals’ attitudes, researchers [6] have highlighted 
dynamic aspects such as changes in users’ attitudes 
toward new information technologies while 
experiencing them as part of their decision making. 
Thus, individuals’ algorithm aversion and appreciation 
may evolve depending on their experiences in AI-aided 
decision-making environments (e.g., initial algorithm 
aversion then algorithm appreciation). Because AI 
possesses a distinct characteristic—reinforcement 
learning [1]—forms of AI adopted by individuals should 
be considered as dynamic rather than static, potentially 
changing individuals’ attitudes and behaviors. A key 
issue is that existing theories do not adequately address 
individuals’ attitudes and behaviors in explaining why 
and how they adapt (or do not adapt) in AI-aided 
decision-making contexts over time. To our knowledge, 
current research provides only limited theoretical 
insights about the individuals’ adaptation [6] and limited 
perceptual evidence on how the technology may 
influence individuals’ performance over time.  
Consider an experienced manager asked to estimate 
the asset value of a company. Although the manager 
does not know the true value, they have an initial 
estimate (a self-generated first anchor) of $300 million 
based on their own analysis of the information, their 
heuristics, and their expertise. The manager can also 
refer to a value from the previous year (an externally 
generated second anchor), which could be $295 million, 
for example. When AI suggests a valuation of $320 
million, then the manager might update their estimate to 
$315 million. If the company later sells for $316 million, 
the manager’s belief in the AI recommendations may 
increase, which may reinforce the manager’s attitudes 
toward AI and thus increase reliance on its 
recommendations in future decision making. However, 
if the company sells for $305 million, the opposite may 





occur. This example implies that individuals’ attitudes 
toward AI advice may be not only a function of their 
own decision-making strategies, with respect to their 
susceptibility to anchoring biases, but also a function of 
outcomes from their experiences using AI. 
While addressing existing studies’ limitations, this 
study explores the following issues that can influence 
individuals’ attitudes toward AI advice. First, decision 
makers may perceive that AI advice significantly 
deviates from their own initial estimates, which can act 
as self-generated anchors. In this case, it is worth asking 
whether individuals exhibit the anchoring bias—
representing decision makers’ tendency to consider 
irrelevant information [7]— in the context of AI-aided 
decision making [8]. Second, individuals within 
organizations tend to receive information from various 
sources, some of which can be inconsistent. Expanding 
the first issue to multiple anchors [9], how do 
individuals consider AI advice, which may or may not 
be consistent with that of other information sources? 
One possibility is that if multiple anchors are available 
to individuals [9], this may mitigate the influence of AI 
advice on individuals’ final decisions. Third, AI often 
needs to learn from decision makers’ expertise and 
heuristics when correct answers do not exist a priori and 
irreducible uncertainties are prevalent. Individuals also 
learn the qualities of AI while adapting to AI-aided 
decision-making contexts. Considering such AI-user 
coevolution, do AI and its users assimilate to each 
other? If so, perhaps AI can help individuals overcome 
the anchoring bias. Finally, can AI help individuals 
make decisions more accurately? Though individuals 
have the tendency to rely on heuristics to make 
judgments [10], such tendencies may lead to cognitive 
biases that can have detrimental effects. Hence, this 
study focuses on determining whether and how AI 
advice can help enhance individuals’ decision accuracy.  
We conducted two longitudinal experiments in the 
corporate credit rating context, in which correct answers 
exist stochastically, akin to many other non-routine 
tasks in organizations. Therefore, AI can help users 
make decisions in uncertain contexts by providing 
statistically better (but not correct) predictions [1]. In the 
first experiment, we examined the effect of the 
difference between individuals’ initial estimate and AI 
advice on their decision-making behaviors. In the 
second experiment, we expanded the first experiment to 
multiple anchor contexts by providing a second anchor 
(previous-year credit score). While differentiating the 
conditions, we consistently consider individuals’ 
experiential learning in the two experiments as 
individuals were asked to rate credits for ten companies 
 
1 The accuracy of AI was higher than that of its users in our 
experiments. Detailed results are provided in the method sections. 
per session. By doing so, we could better identify how 
AI technologies influence choice shifts and, 
furthermore, how AI becomes an integrated part of 
human decision making via interactions with users [6]. 
2. Hypotheses 
We employ experiential learning theory [11] and 
anchoring effects [8, 12-14] to understand individuals’ 
attitudes toward AI advice and the advice’s effects on 
their final choices over time. We follow Simmons et al. 
[15] integrative theory of anchoring, combining the 
anchoring-and-adjustment model and selective 
accessibility model to better understand how individuals 
accept AI advice and the extent to which they adjust 
their own judgments after receiving the advice. 
According to Simmons et al, individuals’ debiasing 
behaviors are likely to depend on their confidence about 
the direction of their initial choice shifts. Additionally,  
we adopt the experiential learning perspective [11] to 
understand the mechanisms through which individuals’ 
experiences with AI advice may assimilate them to AI 
and reinforce their acceptance of AI advice and choice 
adjustment behaviors.  
2.1. Individuals’ assimilation to AI advice 
Individuals tend to learn with practice [16], and 
individuals’ experiences with AI can provide 
opportunities to build knowledge about their decision 
making and to evaluate the accuracy of AI advice. 
Individuals’ attitudes can evolve based on their 
interactions with technologies [6]. By accepting or 
rejecting AI’s recommendations, individuals can 
evaluate their performance based on their experiences 
using AI. They perceive certain levels of performance 
by both rejecting and accepting AI advice. The 
experience may renew their knowledge about the 
decision contexts and AI. While doing so, individuals 
may learn about how AI makes judgments and whether 
they need to emulate the judgments. They can apply 
their learning to subsequent decision making. 
Considering that AI is believed to have higher accuracy 
than humans1, individuals’ initial estimates may be 
similar to those of AI advice2 as they have more 
experiences with AI-aided decision making. Hence, we 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The difference between AI advice and 
individuals’ initial estimates decreases as individuals 
gain AI-assisted decision-making experience. 
2 We provided AI advice to individuals after they made initial 
choices to more accurately identify the assimilation of users to AI.  
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2.2. Acceptance of and relative dependence on AI 
advice 
According to the anchoring-and-adjustment 
perspective [7, 17, 18], individuals who are confident in 
their initial estimates tend to cease making adjustments 
and deliver these estimates. On the contrary individuals 
who do not have such confidence may feel the need to 
modify their estimates. This perspective assumes that 
individuals who are motivated to modify their initial 
estimates tend to generate estimates that are farther from 
the anchored estimates [18]. Clarifying this, Simmons et 
al. [15] suggest that corrections of initial estimates can 
occur both far from and close to initial estimates 
depending on the decision makers’ confidence about the 
direction of adjustment from anchors. That is, when 
individuals are certain about the direction of adjustment 
but perceive that their adjustment is insufficient, they 
are more likely to adjust their initial estimates.  
Applying this to our research context, if individuals 
believe that their initial estimates (based on their 
understanding of existing information) diverge from AI 
advice, they are more likely to motivate to change their 
initial estimates, moving them closer to those provided 
by AI. On the contrary, if individuals believe that their 
initial estimates are close to those given by AI, they may 
think that the estimates are reasonable and feel satisfied 
[19]. They are also less likely to feel the need to 
recalibrate their estimates based on AI advice, instead 
sustaining their initial estimates’ proximity to the 
advice. In this decision-making context, AI advice may 
act as a standard of comparison [20, 21]. In this way, 
similar to psychological theories of social proof [22], 
individuals can infer their final estimates from AI 
advice. Thus, they may have increased certainty about 
their initial judgments [23] and not feel the need to 
adjust their estimates when the AI advice is close to their 
initial estimates. This results in low acceptance of AI 
advice, followed by adjustment of initial estimates. 
Thus, we suggest the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Greater differences between AI 
advice and individuals’ initial estimates lead to their 
greater acceptance of AI advice. 
Acceptance of AI advice may not mean that 
individuals totally follow AI advice. If so, how much do 
individuals tend to change initial judgments after 
accepting AI advice as a reference? Researchers have 
generally observed that individuals focus more on 
anchor-consistent information; hence, selective 
accessibility tends to produce assimilative effects on 
individuals’ judgments [13, 24]. Thus, individuals may 
keep their final choices closer to AI advice when the 
advice is similar to their initial estimates, because they 
may be more confident about the direction of their 
choice shifts. We suggest two mechanisms through 
which individuals are more likely to have confidence 
and exhibit the typical assimilative effects of anchors. 
First, individuals attempt to increase their cognitive 
efficiency by using mental models [25], which are 
representations of reality that allow individuals to make 
sense of the world in their conceptions of causality, 
expectations, and beliefs [26]. In other words, 
individuals may disregard information that should be 
considered if it does not correspond with their mental 
models. Such biased perceptions can make decision 
makers select information that supports their preexisting 
beliefs [18]. Several studies [e.g., 27] have shown that 
individuals tend to pay more (less) attention to 
(dis)confirmatory information in organizational 
decision-making contexts. Researchers have also found 
that similarities between a user and a recommendation 
agent are positively related to behavioral beliefs, 
particularly when users’ decision making is more likely 
to be preferential and driven by heuristics [28, 29]. 
Second, individuals tend to exhibit egocentric biases, 
causing them to downplay the advice of other (more 
accurate) people or entities [30]. Accordingly, 
individuals are quite attached to and prefer to follow 
their intuitive judgments even while explicitly 
recognizing that other judgments are objectively correct 
[31]. Individuals are less likely to give higher weight to 
their own opinions [32] or ignore the advice that they 
receive [33]. The pursuit of cognitive efficiency and 
egocentric bias both can occur in anchoring contexts, 
creating a push-away effect, which leads to fewer 
estimates close to the advice [34]. 
Applying this reasoning to AI-aided decision 
making, even if AI is capable of making more accurate 
estimates than individuals, individuals may not be free 
from their own initial estimates due to their pursuit of 
cognitive efficiency and their egocentric biases. Though 
individuals can accumulate task-specific knowledge and 
adapt to AI-aided decision contexts, they may not be 
free from the anchoring bias, as evidenced by experts’ 
susceptibility to anchoring [35]. For instance, Meub and 
Proeger [36] found that even after individuals 
accumulate task-specific knowledge based on 
comprehensive information about and repetition of 
identical tasks, they may still exhibit anchoring bias 
despite the modest learning effect. Hence, when the 
difference between an initial estimate and AI advice is 
greater, individuals will continue to select a final 
estimate that is relatively closer to the initial estimate, 
representing an assimilative effect [24]. We propose the 
concept of relative dependence on AI advice, 
representing the difference between an individual’s final 
choice and their initial choice vis-à-vis the AI advice. 
This means that when individuals make final decisions 
closer to the AI advice than to their initial estimates, 
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they are more likely to depend on the AI advice. We 
suggest the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Greater differences between AI 
advice and individuals’ initial estimates lead to their 
less relative dependence on AI advice. 
2.3. Influence of multiple anchors 
Decision-making environments in organizations 
can have multiple anchors, which may determine the 
focal anchor’s effect on decision making under 
uncertainty [37]. Although their initial estimates as an 
anchor may influence the role of AI advice, individuals 
are also exposed to other informational clues in their 
decision-making processes (e.g., experts’ opinions or 
decisions made in similar situations). Prior studies have 
focused primarily on single-anchor contexts [9, 38]. 
Although few in number, prior studies have discovered 
some common mechanisms in the multiple-anchor 
context. For instance, though any anchor in multiple-
anchor contexts can exert some effects on final 
decisions [38, 39], the most highly applicable anchor 
has the strongest effect on the final decision [9].  
Based on these findings, we posit that when 
multiple anchors (e.g., previous-year credit scores and 
initial estimates) are available, it may mitigate the 
assimilation of individuals’ initial estimates to AI 
advice. This is because individuals possessing 
incomplete information are more likely to employ other 
information sources to increase their accuracy, when 
uncertainty is irreducible. Individuals may recognize the 
advantages of considering AI advice while they are 
adapting to decision-making contexts. In doing so, they 
can compare their initial estimates, a second anchor, and 
AI advice and then decide to depend on AI advice more 
selectively. In this decision contexts, decision makers 
may rely more on past decisions as a reference [37]. 
Hence, we propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: When individuals are exposed to a 
second anchor, the difference between individuals’ 
initial estimates and AI advice is less likely to decrease 
as they gain more AI-assisted decision-making 
experience, compared to when not exposed to a second 
anchor. 
The presence of multiple anchors mitigates the 
effect of any single anchor [9, 37]. As individuals are 
less likely to rely primarily on AI advice when in the 
presence of a second anchor, the influence of the 
difference between AI advice and individuals’ initial 
choice on their accuracy may decline as well. Because 
multiple anchors are available, individuals may not need 
to rely solely on the difference between their initial 
choice and AI advice in their decision makings. Instead, 
they may compare their initial estimates, AI advice, and 
a second anchor and then make their final decision. Put 
differently, even if individuals’ initial estimates are 
different from AI advice, they may consider a second 
anchor’s value. Particularly in the research context 
employing previous-year credit score as a second 
anchor, prior studies have demonstrated that individuals 
are more likely to pay attention to previous decisions 
made by others in comparable situations rather than 
maintaining an anchor [37], as past comparable 
estimates offer social proof [40]. Formally, 
Hypothesis 5: When individuals are exposed to a 
second anchor, the positive effect of the difference 
between AI advice and their initial estimate on their 
acceptance of the advice is weaker, compared to when 
not exposed to a second anchor.  
Hypothesis 6: When individuals are exposed to a 
second anchor, the negative effect of the difference 
between AI advice and their initial estimate on their 
relative dependence on AI advice is weaker, compared 
to when not exposed to a second anchor. 
2.4. Effect of AI advice on decision accuracy 
The accuracy of individuals’ final estimates 
depends on their efforts to adjust their initial estimates. 
Thus, individuals’ acceptance of AI advice alone may 
not enhance their accuracy. Given the uncertainty 
surrounding the true value being estimated, individuals 
have a range of estimates that they believe plausible. 
They are likely to cease making adjustments if they have 
arrived at a satisfactory (rather than the most accurate) 
estimate [19]. This “satisficing” often leads to 
egocentrically biased responses at the expense of 
enhanced accuracy [19] due to selective accessibility; in 
turn, this selective accessibility stems from individuals’ 
efficiency pursuits while employing mental models 
[25]. Applying this rationale to this research context, 
individuals’ acceptance of AI advice may imply that 
they have neither satisficed nor intend to finish their 
adjustments. Instead, they intend to reconsider the 
accuracy of their initial estimates. Thus, the accuracy of 
individuals’ final estimates may increase through these 
effortful processes when accepting AI advice. However, 
we should note that individuals are not entirely free from 
egocentric biases, which can decrease their accuracy 
even when they intentionally adjust the initial estimates. 
Similarly, researchers have found that individuals tend 
to adjust approximately 30-35% of their estimates closer 
to advice received from others, which can hinder 
accuracy [42]. Even if individuals attempt to adjust their 
estimates, they tend to average their own judgment with 
the advice received [3], which can prevent them from 
reaping the full benefits of the external advice. Hence, 
we focus on the effect of relative dependence on the AI 
advice—that is, the difference between an individual’s 
final choice and their initial choice vis-à-vis the AI 
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advice—on decision accuracy. We posit that high levels 
of relative dependence on AI advice– rather than mere 
acceptance of AI advice –can represent the outcomes of 
individuals’ debiasing efforts, which can yield higher 
decision accuracy. Formally, 
Hypothesis 7: Relative dependence on AI advice 
increases the accuracy of individuals’ final estimates. 
3. Method  
3.1. Overview of experiments 
This study aimed to identify whether AI can help 
individuals overcome anchoring biases while also 
extending the research literature to multiple-anchor, AI-
aided decision-making contexts. Our goal was to 
explain how and when a potentially salient reference in 
decision making, AI advice, can influence individuals’ 
dependence on AI advice and decision-making 
accuracy. We developed a 2 (similarity vs. non-
similarity) X 2 (previous-year credit score vs. no 
previous-year credit score) between-subjects design. 
We conducted two longitudinal experiments using 
corporate credit ratings, where machine learning 
techniques and related AI systems are widely developed 
and utilized throughout organizations [43]. Experiment 
1 aimed to determine whether individuals are more 
likely to take advice when their initial estimates are 
closer to that advice in the two-stage anchoring process 
(the independent initial estimate-then-revise-estimate 
sequence)—adopting the advice, then reflecting and 
shifting to a self-generated value. Experiment 2 
explored whether the results found in Experiment 1 
could be replicated in multiple-anchor contexts, which 
characterize many task environments and affect 
anchoring’s ability to influence judgments under 
uncertain conditions [9, 34].  
We recruited participants from major universities in 
South Korea, providing 15,000 Korean won (KRW, 1 
USD = 1,100 KRW in January, 2021) for their 
participation. We also motivated them to enhance their 
learning and decision accuracy efforts by offering them 
50,000 to 100,000 KRW based on their performance. 
We distributed online links to individuals via email, 
which indicated their voluntary participation in the 
experiments. Participants had to learn how to rate credit 
scores based on company-relevant information before 
entering the experiment. We emphasized that the AI 
advice that they were receiving would not be 100% 
accurate and thus that they needed to employ the advice 
strategically. Participants were required to complete 
three experimental sessions. In each session, they 
completed 10 corporate credit rating tasks over 
approximately 10 days. All participants encountered the 
same questions but in different orders. Once participants 
had finished a session, they could move on to the next 
session after five days. In total, they assigned credit 
ratings to 30 companies for three sessions over 
approximately two months. We anonymized the names 
of firms, meaning that participants could not rate their 
credit based on external sources. 
Participants estimated each company’s credit at two 
timepoints: before and after receiving AI advice. Thus, 
participants made initial estimates based purely on 
information provided about a company (Experiment 1) 
or this information combined with the company’s 
previous-year credit score (Experiment 2). Then, 
participants received AI advice. After receiving this 
advice, participants had the opportunity to adjust their 
initial estimates only when they answered “Yes” to the 
question “Will you accept AI advice and change the 
initial estimate?” That is, participants estimated an 
initial value and adjusted it as needed to arrive at a final 
judgment. After completing one session, participants 
viewed their aggregated performance per session. That 
is, they did not know the accuracy of decision makings 
during the sessions.  
 
Figure 1. Experimental Design 
 
3.2. AI-based recommendation system development 
We developed AI-based systems to manipulate the 
conditions: (1) one system recommending credit scores 
based only on historical data for credit events, with the 
other providing credit scores based on both historical 
data and users’ initial estimates; and (2) one system 
providing companies’ previous-year credit scores 
before participants estimated an initial credit rating, 
with the other not offering this information. We 
embedded machine learning algorithms in the systems. 
We employed the caret and xgboost packages as well as 
the linear regression, random forest, and gradient-
boosted decision tree techniques offered by R statistics. 
We used credit events obtained from Korea Enterprise 
Data, which is one of the largest companies providing 
corporate credit information in South Korea for banks 
and government entities. Within the database, credit 
scores were classified into 20 rating categories: 1 
(highest) ~ 20 (cannot be graded)). The initial dataset 
included more than 113,000 credit events from 2002 to 
2017, while the final set included 842 year-company 
paired credit events from 2015 to 2017, as some data 
(e.g., intellectual properties [IPs]) had a much shorter 


















longer than three years. For AI training purposes, we 
included 18 financial (e.g., total assets, paid-in capital, 
annual sales) and non-financial attributes (e.g., number 
of international IPs and company locations) that have 
been identified by prior studies [e.g., 44] as influencing 
corporate credit ratings. We also provided these 
attributes to the participants. Both the AI systems and 
the participants employed the same information to 
estimate credit scores. After training the AI with the 
dataset, we compared AI-recommended credit ratings 
with ones taken from the database. Without learning 
users’ heuristics, AI advice had a root mean squared 
error (RMSE) of 2.513. That is, when the AI system 
recommended 15, the true value would range from 
12.487 to 17.513 with 99% probability. 
Participants. We recruited MBA students and 
senior-level students in several major business schools 
in South Korea, who had varied experiences and 
backgrounds. None of them participated more than once 
in any individual experiment. In Experiment 1 and 2, 
122 and 135 participants completed the three sessions.  
3.3. Measures 
Acceptance of AI Advice. For ith individual on the 
qth decision task, we measured individuals’ acceptance 
of AI advice (Acceptiq) with the question “Will you 
accept AI advice and change the initial estimate?” (Yes 
= 1, No = 0).  
Relative Dependence on AI Advice over Initial 
Estimates. We employed the Judge Advisor System 
(JAS) paradigm [45], to measure relative dependence on 
AI advice over initial estimates (DepAIiq) by calculating 
|"#!"	%	&#!"|
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, where FEiq is the final 
estimate, IEiq is the initial estimate, and AIAiq is the 
value of AI advice. We should note that when FEiq 
equaled IEiq or AIAiq, we assigned difference scores of 
0.01. DepAIiq had a value ranging from 0 (abandoning 
the AI advice) to 1 (abandoning the initial estimate).  
Decision Accuracy. We measured the accuracy 
(Accuracyiq) of individuals’ decisions by comparing 
their final estimates with the values in the database as 
20 - |FEiq – Database Valueiq |. 
Experience. For the ith individual on the qth decision 
task, we operationalized participants’ experience by 
counting the number of credit scoring decision tasks.  
Difference between AI Advice and Initial 
Estimates. We computed the difference between the 
initial estimate and the AI advice (Difiq) as |IEiq – AIAiq|.  
Control Variables. We included several 
pretreatment control variables to reduce residual 
variation and increase our estimates’ precision. We 
included educational background, work experience, and 
current occupation to control for the effect of domain 
knowledge on the use of AI advice [1]. We also included 
participants’ age, gender, and university to control for 
unobserved effects on the dependent variables and for 
the anchoring effect [3]. Finally, we included session 
dummy variables to control for learning effects across 
sessions and other unobserved effects within sessions. 
3.4. Analyses  
We built a dynamic panel dataset based on 
observations of the participants’ decisions and 
behaviors to estimate the parameters. We measured the 
variables repeatedly, and they had a nested nature—
decision tasks nested in sessions, nested in individuals. 
The individual and session-specific components should 
be correlated with the regressors (E[X, ψ] ¹ 0 and/or 
E[X, ξ] ¹ 0). That is, the common error component over 
individuals and sessions may induce serial correlations 
across the composite error terms [46]. Durbin-Watson 
tests failed to reject the null hypothesis that serial 
correlations were equal to zero for the variables (p = 
1.000 for Difiq, p = .733 for Acceptiq, p = .168 for 
DepAIiq, and p = .568 for Accuracyiq). Thus, we 
conducted generalized linear modeling (GLM) with a 
general feasible generalized least square (FGLS) 
method.  
4. Results 
The results of Hausman test revealed significant 
differences between the fixed-effect and random-effects 
models when we employed dependent variables. Thus, 
we employed the fixed-effects model. As shown in 
Model 1-1 in Table 1, Difiq which represents the 
opposite of assimilation, increased as individuals 
assigned more credit ratings (coefficient = 0.0369, p 
< .001); thus, H1 was not supported. In Model 1-1, the 
effect of experience on Difiq depended on the existence 
of a second anchor (coefficient = - 0.0322, p < .001). We 
split the sample into two groups—those not exposed to 
a second anchor (Experiment 1) and those exposed to a 
second anchor (Experiment 2). As shown in Model 1-2, 
as participants assigned more credit ratings without a 
second anchor, Difiq decreased (coefficient = - 0.0392, p 
< .001). On the contrary, as shown in Model 1-3, as 
individuals completed more decision tasks with a 
second anchor, Difiq increased (coefficient = 0.0820, p 
< .01). These two coefficients were statistically different 
(t = 13.719, p < .01). Overall, without extra information 
that can influence individuals’ initial estimates, users 
are more likely to assimilate to AI advice over time. 
However, a second anchor may reduce assimilation. 
These results support H4. 
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Table 1. Results: User-AI Difference 
Dependent Variable: User-AI Difference 




Experiment 2  
(n=4050) 
Model 1-1 Model 1-2 Model 1-3 
Coef Error Coef  Error Coef Error 
D1_Session  -1.5510 *** 0.0720 -0.6283 *** 0.0975 -2.6063 *** 0.0662 
D2_Session -1.9284 *** 0.1364 -0.2896  0.1807 -3.6390 *** 0.1283 
Experience 0.0369 *** 0.0072 -0.0392 *** 0.0097 0.0820 *** 0.0062 
D_Second Anchor X Experience -0.0322 *** 0.0029       
Individual and Demographic Dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   
Multiple R-squared 0.185 0.157 0.222 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
As shown in Models 2-1 and 2-2 in Table 2, after 
controlling for the effect of experience, Difiq positively 
influenced Acceptiq (coefficient = 0.0655, p < .001 and 
0.0748, p < .001), supporting H2. Additionally, the 
interaction between Difiq and D_Second Anchor 
negatively affected Acceptiq (coefficient = - 0.0188, p 
< .001). Thus, the effect of Difiq on Acceptiq depends 
on the existence of a second anchor. We split the 
sample into two groups and conducted subgroup 
analysis. As shown in Models 2-3 and 2-4, Dif 
positively influenced Acceptiq more strongly in the 
absence of a second anchor (coefficient = 0.0705, p 
< .001) compared to when a second anchor was 
present (coefficient = 0.0496, p < .001). The difference 
between the two groups’ coefficients was statistically 
significant (t = 8.731, p < .05). This indicates that 
when individuals were exposed to a second anchor, the 
positive effect of Difiq on Acceptiq was weaker, 
supporting H5. 
 
Table 2. Results: Acceptance of AI Advice 
Dependent Variable: AI Use 
Experiments 1 + 2  
(n=7710) 




Model 2-1 Model 2-2 Model 2-3 Model 2-4 
Coef  Error Coef  Error Coef  Error Coef Error 
D1_Session  0.1085 *** 0.0132 0.0966 *** 0.0134 0.0738 *** 0.0179 0.0369 *** 0.0136 
D2_Session 0.2073 *** 0.0279 0.1884 *** 0.0281 0.1655 *** 0.0405 0.1257 *** 0.0342 
Experience -0.0056 *** 0.0014 -0.0064 *** 0.0016 -0.0064 ** 0.0020 -0.0015  0.0017 
User-AI Difference (Dif) 0.0655 *** 0.0017 0.0748 *** 0.0024 0.0705 *** 0.0019 0.0496 *** 0.0019 
D_Second Anchor X Dif    -0.0188 *** 0.0034       
D_Second Anchor X Experience    0.0030 * 0.0013      
Individual and Demographic Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Multiple R-squared 0.291 0.311 0.353 0.222 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
We included only observations who accepted AI 
advice in this analysis in our analysis on the relative 
dependence on AI. As shown in Models 3-1 and 3-2 
(Table 3), after controlling for the effect of experience, 
Difiq negatively influenced DepAIiq (coefficient = - 
0.0235, p < .001 and - 0.0134, p <.001), supporting H3. 
Difiq negatively influenced DepAIiq more strongly in the 
presence of a second anchor (coefficient = - 0.0138, p 
<.001), compared to when a second anchor was absent 
(coefficient = - 0.0022, p < .001). The difference 
between the two groups’ coefficients was statistically 
significant (t = 21.789, p < .05). Thus, H6 was not 
supported.  
We expected that DepAIiq would increase decision 
accuracy. As shown in Models 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 in Table 
4, after controlling for the effects of experience, DepAIiq 
positively influenced accuracy, with coefficients of 
1.1260 (p < .001), 3.2278 (p < .001), and 2.1539 (p 
<.001), respectively. The effect is consistently positive, 
independent of a second anchor’s existence. Thus, H7 
was supported.  
6. Discussion and Conclusions  
AI advice’s influence on individuals’ judgments 
and decision making has been garnering much attention 
among researchers, but there is still limited theoretical 
understanding in this regard. In the context of two-stage 
anchoring processes (the independent estimate-then-
revise-estimate sequence), which reflects organizational 
decision-making situations [34], the results clearly 
demonstrate that AI advice may not fully eliminate 
individuals’ anchoring biases (e.g., [13, 14], [23]) even 
when learning occurs in repeated tasks [36]. 
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Furthermore, the difference between individuals’ initial 
estimates and AI advice can increase effortful 
adjustments but can also paradoxically motivate 
individuals to stay close to their initial estimates. That 
is, the results support our expectations that while 
adjusting their estimates according to anchors, 
individuals tend to exhibit egocentric biases in AI-aided 
decision-making contexts. This may be a reason why 
individuals are often unable to reap the full benefits of 
AI advice and why accuracy may not sufficiently 
increase as expected. 
 
 
Table 3. Results: Dependence on AI Advice Relative to Individuals’ Initial Estimate 
Dependent Variable: Relative 
Dependence on AI Advice  
(only for the observations  
accepting AI advice) 
Experiments 1 + 2  
(n=2520) 
Experiment 1  
(n=1308) 
Experiment 2  
(n=1212) 
Model 3-1 Model 3-2 Model 3-3 Model 3-4 
Coef  Error Coef  Error Coef  Error Coef  Error 
D1_Session  -0.0945 *** 0.0039 -0.0757 *** 0.0049 -0.0044  0.0070 0.0811 *** 0.0058 
D2_Session -0.1591 *** 0.0065 -0.2689 *** 0.0071 0.0357 *** 0.0086 0.1307 *** 0.0106 
Experience 0.0041 *** 0.0003 0.0138 *** 0.0003 0.0016 *** 0.0003 -0.0057 *** 0.0004 
User-AI Difference (Dif) -0.0235 *** 0.0006 -0.0134 *** 0.0006 -0.0022 *** 0.0005 -0.0138 *** 0.0005 
D_Second Anchor X Dif    -0.0575 *** 0.0010       
D_Second Anchor X Experience    -0.0052 *** 0.0004       
Individual and Demographic Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Multiple R-squared 0.658 0.649 0.676   0.669   
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Table 4. Results: Decision Making Accuracy 
Dependent Variable: Accuracy 




Experiment 2  
(n=4050) 
Model 4-1 Model 4-2 Model 4-3 Model 4-4 
Coef  Error Coef  Error Coef  Error Coef Error 
D1_Session  1.3274 *** 0.0449 1.8118 *** 0.0435 1.3094 *** 0.0382 1.1075 *** 0.0327 
D2_Session 1.7697 *** 0.1059 1.8624 *** 0.0838 1.8483 *** 0.0674 1.2177 *** 0.0681 
Experience -0.0276 *** 0.0053 0.0012  0.0047 -0.0302 *** 0.0026 0.0150 *** 0.0027 
D_Acceptance of AI Advice (D_AAI, Dummy)            
Relative Dependence on AI Advice (RD)   1.1260 *** 0.0757 3.2278 *** 0.0552 2.1539 *** 0.0357 
D_Second Anchor X Experience    -0.0275 *** 0.0024      
D_Second Anchor X D_AAI            
D_Second Anchor X RD    0.6619 *** 0.0822      
Individual and Demographic Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Multiple R-squared 0.218 0.314 0.296 0.333 
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Several studies (e.g., [28], [29]) have 
demonstrated that individuals are more likely to accept 
algorithmic recommendations similar to their own 
choices in heuristic decision-making contexts. 
However, the present study shows that individuals can 
be still biased toward their initial judgments even after 
accepting algorithmic advice; thus, mere acceptance of 
AI advice may not be sufficient to shift choices. 
Hence, our research extends past findings by showing 
that the impact of AI advice may differ in the two 
stages of decision making: (1) intentions to accept AI 
advice and (2) adjustments to initial estimates. Further, 
the results indicate that multiple anchors have 
potential to increase the negative influence of the 
difference between self-generated anchors (initial 
estimates in this study) and AI advice on the 
dependence on AI advice. However, when AI advice 
is similar to the value of a second anchor (but not an 
initial estimate) it can increase the dependence on the 
advice, helping individuals debias themselves from 
their anchors. Considering that few studies have 
examined multiple anchors [9], this study expands our 
understanding of second anchors’ impact on AI-aided 
decision making by determining the roles of its 
consistency with other information sources.  
Our study’s results suggest that AI advice may 
lower decision accuracy in contexts where individuals 
do not sufficiently change their initial judgments. 
Further, individuals in the presence of a second anchor 
may exhibit decreasing decision accuracy by 
accepting AI advice. However, individuals’ decision 
accuracy improves if they not only accept AI advice 
but also maintain proximity to the advice. Hence, this 
study demonstrates whether and how AI can enhance 
decision accuracy, and it contributes to our theoretical 
understanding of the relationship between AI use and 
decision performance. 
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Investment in AI-based DSS has increased in 
recent years across industries, with the hope of 
enhancing decision-making effectiveness But, this 
study indicates that individuals may not reap the full 
benefits of AI-based DSS without proper decision 
strategies that account for biases and learning. Thus, 
our research shows that when implementing AI 
technologies, organizations must also train their 
employees in leveraging AI advice optimally. Such 
training should focus on individuals’ paradoxical 
choice shifts. Namely, if AI advice is statistically more 
accurate than their judgments, employees must be 
informed that their final decisions may be enhanced by 
more closely following the AI advice.  
We should note that this study did not measure the 
psychological constructs and identify their influence 
on choice shifts, as it focused on data directly 
reflecting initial and final choices. Such objective 
measures have their benefits, but not assessing the 
psychological mechanisms underlying the choice 
shifts does represent a limitation. Future research 
could assess these relevant constructs, for instance, by 
measuring the confidence that individuals have in their 
initial judgments and examining how the perceived 
quality of the AI advice influences individuals’ 
behaviors. Thus, future studies could build on our 
speculations and methodology by focusing on the 
underlying mechanisms of human behaviors in AI-
aided decision-making contexts.
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